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IMPOUNDMENT: A SEARCH FOR LEGAL PRINCIPLES*
L. HARoLD LEvNsON* * and

JON L. MILts

* **

Impoundment has been an executive practice, at least in some form, since
1803 when Thomas Jefferson declined to spend funds appropriated for gunboats on the Mississippi. Jefferson's reason was simple: boats were no longer
needed to protect the river's east bank because the west bank had been recently purchased from the French." This refusal to spend caused little furor.
In 1972 and 1973, however, impoundment became a topic of heated controversy as the "battle of the budget" raged. Many Congressmen asserted that
the President was usurping their so-called "power of the purse," 2 while President Nixon labeled Congress fiscally irresponsible spendthrifts.3
The impoundment controversy became one of the crucial issues in the
general confrontation between President and Congress arising in the aftermath of the Watergate episode, and impoundment is included amongst the
matters to be considered by the House Judiciary Committee in its inquiry
into impeachment of the President.4
Currently no statute defines "impoundment," nor is any definition universally accepted. The Federal Impoundment and Information Act, 5 the first
enactment directly relating to the practice, directs the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) to report "funds impounded," but the Act provides no
*The authors gratefully acknowledge support received from the Josephine H. McIntosh
Foundation for a year-long research project at the Holland Law Center, University of
Florida. This article is part of the report on impoundment and the budget process resulting
from that study. Additional parts of the report, including recommendations for reform, will
shortly appear elsewhere. The authors also acknowledge research assistance rendered by
Albert Hadeed, Atilla Ilkson, Andrew Markus, Ron Swanson, and Robert Young, law students
at the University of Florida, and editorial services by Linda Barnett, impoundment project
staff assistant.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors.
**B.B.A. 1957, LL.B. 1962, University of Miami; LL.M. 1964, New York University; 19641966, Jervey Fellow in Comparative Law, Columbia University; Professor of Law, University
of Florida; 1973-1974, Visiting Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Member, The Florida
Bar and The New York Bar.
***B.A. 1969, Stetson University; J.D. 1972, University of Florida; Director, Center for
Governmental Responsibility; former Director, Executive Impoundment Project, University of
Florida; Member, The Florida Bar and The Federal Bar - Northern District of Florida, Fifth
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1. See Cooper, Analysis of Alleged 1803 Precedent for Impoundment Practice in Nixon
Administration, in Joint Hearings on S. 373 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment
of Funds of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 676 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as 1973 Hearings]. Some disagree that this was an impoundment in the present sense
and argue that it has no precedent for the contemporary practice. Id. at 676-77.
2. 1973 Hearings,supra note 1, at 4-6.
3. Id. at 289-40.
4. Impoundment is listed as an item in the category of "other conduct" on which im.
peachment can be based. STAFF OF HOUsE COMM. ON THE JuDiCIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., IMPeACHMENT INQUIRY 1 (Comm. Print, Feb. 5, 1974).
5. 31 U.S.C.A. §581(c)(1) (Supp. 197.).
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definition of the term. OMB has chosen a narrow approach, reporting only
those items that fit under its definition of "reserves." In part, that definition
reads: 6
[Reserves] may be established as a result of changes in requirements,
greater efficiency of operations or other developments subsequent to the
date on which the budget authority was enacted .... [and] ... to provide for contingencies or for subsequent apportionment.
7
The OMB definition derives chiefly from the Anti-Deficiency Act, a measure
cited by the Administration as authority to impound. Applying its narrow
definition, the OMB failed to report, for example, that President Nixon
ordered the Environmental Protection Agency not to spend $5 billion under
the Water and Sewers Act.8
Responding to the narrow approach of the OMB, current Senate and
House proposals are much broader in scope. For example, a Senate bill lists
a number of specific types of action considered impoundments and concludes
with a catch-all provision that covers: "Any type of Executive action or inaction which effectively precludes or delays the obligation or expenditure of
any part of authorized budget authority." 9
A literal reading of this catch-all phrase might suggest that an "impoundment" takes place when the President appoints an official to head an on-going
program, with the understanding that the appointee will take future measures
to cut or delay spending. The context of the Senate bill indicates it is intended
to cover only those actions that directly and measurably affect spending;
evidently the selection of an appointee would not be included. With this clarification, the present article adopts the broad definitional approach of the
Senate bill.
Even under the OMB definition, the impact of impoundment has been
massive. OMB reported "reserves" of $7.5 billion as of September S0, 1973,10
and $11.8 billion as of February 4, 1974.11 These OMB reserves include, for
example, the reduction of $1.5 billion in housing construction funds, which
the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials claims will
result in a $7.5 billion loss to the economy. 12 A broader definition of impound3
ment would also recognize that in the Water Pollution Control Act,' Congress
authorized S11 billion for fiscal years 1973 and 1974; but the President ordered

6. U. S. OFFICE OF MANGEMENT & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No.
EXECUTION §42.7 (1971).

A-34,

INSTRUCTIONS ON BUDGET

7. 31 U.S.C. §665 (1970).
8. 1973 Hearings, supra note 1,at 403 (statement of Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Administrator Ruckelshaus).
9. S. 373, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
10. OMB Report Under Impoundment and Information Act, 38 Fed. Reg. 19, 581 (1973).
11. OMB Report Under Impoundment & Information Act, 39 Fed. Reg. 7707, 7708 (1974).
12. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Space-Science-Veterans of the House Ap.
propriationsComm., 93d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3, at 69 (1973).
13. 33 U.S.C.A. §§1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
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that only $5 billion be spent,' 4 resulting in an "impoundment" of the $6
billion difference. Impoundments have hampered planning by state and local
governments, causing disruption in their budgets.' 5 Additionally, impoundment has meant unemployment for at least 80,000 citizens. 16
During 1973 over 61 impoundment cases were filed in federal district
courts, and apparently impoundment will be a judicial issue for some time.
This article will discuss constitutional and statutory provisions and past cases
relevant to the current impoundment controversy.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The power to impound or withhold appropriated funds is not mentioned
in the Constitution. As a result both the critics and proponents of impoundment have asserted varied constitutional doctrines as supporting their positions. The judicial involvement with the alleged constitutional bases for impoundment has, however, been limited thus far. Only if the Executive asserts
a constitutional right to impound despite an absence of statutory authority
would the courts be compelled to adjudicate the constitutional issues discussed here.
Article I Provisions
Legislative Power. Article I of the Constitution vests the legislative power
in the Congress. 7 Arguably, this implies that Congress alone shall determine
national policy except: (1) when a veto is sustained, (2) when a statute is
declared unconstitutional, or (3) when the Constitution commits certain
policymaking power to another branch.
One of the principal methods by which Congress can determine national
policy is by enacting appropriation bills. If the President impounds funds and
thereby frustrates the congressional policy underlying the appropriation, he
arguably usurps the policymaking power, which article I vests in Congress.
In response, proponents of impoundment have argued that the Constitution establishes a blending of powers, and that the President enjoys considerable discretion, arising from his inherent executive power as well as the
special powers enumerated in article II.
Veto Power. Opponents of impoundment assert that it is, in effect, an unconstitutional expansion of the veto power.

14. 1973 Hearings,supra note 1, at 403 (statement of EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus).
15. Memorandum to Board of Directors, National League of Cities, from Allen E. Prit-

chard, Jr., Executive Vice President, March 1, 1973, on file in the office of the McIntosh
Foundation Executive Impoundment Project, University of Florida, Gainesville.
16. Findings of Irving Goffman, Economic Consultant to the McIntosh Foundation Executive Impoundment Project, University of Florida, College of Law (1973), on file in the
office of the McIntosh Foundation Executive Impoundment Project, University of Florida,
Gainesville. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 18, 1973, at 24, col. 1.
17. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, §.
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In 1967 Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin told his colleagues: "The President of the United States has the item veto authority in terms of whether he
spends money or not, and every one of you gentlemen on Appropriations
knows it."', Although this raw power may exist, some Congressmen find it
constitutionally objectionable because of the veto provision. For example,
Senator Humphrey of Minnesota has stated: 19
I use the term "unconstitutional" about an item veto because the Constitution of the United States, in article I, section 7, clause 2, indicates that
there is a duty upon the part of Congress to reconsider any bill returned
by the President along with the precise objections voiced by the Executive. That is when the President vetoes a bill. The final decisionmaking
power over vetoes rests with the Congress - not with the President.
The Constitution makes no provision for an item veto, and proposals to
introduce this feature into the federal constitution have been consistently
rejected, despite the inclusion of the item veto in the great majority of state
0
constitutions.2
The finality of impoundment as compared with the veto is illustrated by
presidential treatment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.21 President Nixon vetoed the legislation, Congress overrode
the veto, yet the President still impounded. 22 Congress made no attempt to
override the second "veto," which the President had accomplished by means
of impoundment. Discussions of the veto power in the Constitutional Convention show that a veto without override was considered (termed "absolute
negative") but was rejected unanimously as placing too much authority in the
2
hands of a single man. 3
The veto provision is one of the strongest constitutional arguments against
impoundment, since it seemingly allows Congress the last word on policy by
overriding a veto. Chronologically, impoundment follows congressional passage
of a bill and presidential signing or congressional override of a veto. If the
President frustrates the will of Congress by impounding at this juncture, when
Congress has no opportunity to override, he achieves the equivalent of an
absolute veto.

18. CONG. Q., Oct. 6, 1967, at 1996.
19. 118 CONG. REC. S18,040 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1972).
20.

E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE

AND

POWERS 280 (4th ed. 1951); R. WALLACE,
(1960). A large majority of states allow

CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING 141-42

an item veto. Of the 44 states responding to a questionnaire administered by the Executive
Impoundment Project, 40 grant the Governor an item veto over appropriation bills. See, e.g.,
119 CONG. REG. S21,120 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1973) (McIntosh Foundation Executive Impoundment Project Findings).
21. Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816.
22. See 1973 Hearings,supra note 1, at 1012, 1015, 1044.
23. See 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
536-38 (1854).
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Necessary and Proper.In addition to its enumerated powers, Congress has
the power to enact all laws "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
24
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
This has allowed Congress to pass laws that, for example, delineate actions of
executive agencies. The necessary and proper clause would seemingly give
Congress the power to pass laws imposing controls on the Executive's discretion in spending congressional appropriations, unless another constitutional
provision commits discretionary spending power to the Executive.
Article I, in General. The congressional powers to legislate, override vetoes,
raise taxes, appropriate funds, and pass laws deemed necessary and proper 25
strongly imply that the Constitution does place the "power of the purse" with
Congress. This power of the purse logically extends beyond the appropriation
process, so as to include the execution of appropriations. Thus the intent of
Congress should be observed during the execution stage, and the President
may not, by impoundment, frustrate the intent of Congress - unless presidential discretion can be justified by constitutional provisions other than
article I.
Article II Provisions
Faithfully Execute. The requirement that the President "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed"'26 is the most versatile constitutional provision
in the current controversy, cited by both sides in support of their respective
27
viewpoints.
The current executive interpretation is that the clause grants the President
discretion to harmonize conflicting laws. Various Congressmen, on the other
hand, argue that the "faithfully execute" clause itself gives no authority but
is merely a direction to the President to carry out the laws.28
Presidential supporters point to various statutes that may conflict with
congressional authorizations and appropriations: the debt limit, 29 the Employment Act of 1946,30 and the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of
1971.31 The debt limit, it is argued, tells the President he cannot borrow beyond a designated ceiling to make up the difference between what the appropriations permit him to spend and what the revenue bills provide; therefore, he must reduce appropriations. The Employment Act and the Economic
Stabilization Act obligate him to provide a healthy economy, while total expenditure of appropriations may provoke an inflationary spiral.
24. US. CoNsr. art. 1, §8.
25.

US. CONST. art. I, §8.

26. U.S.CONSr. art. 1, §3.
27. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings,supra note 1, at 372-73.
28. Id. at 372.
29. 31 U.S.C.A. §757(b) (Supp. 1973).

30. 14 US.C. §§1021-25 (1970).
31. Act of Aug. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796, amended by Act of Dec. 22,
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 StaL 743.
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Congressional supporters, on the other hand, interpret the "faithfully
execute" clause as requiring the President to make a good faith effort to carry
out the intent of Congress. If Congress enacts a series of statutes in irreconcilable conflict, the President should, under this view, return to Congress for
resolution. This view derives some support from an observation by the Supreme Court, that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully
32
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."
Although the President is not a lawmaker, he may, according to some
interpretations, be authorized and even required to act decisively if Congress
enacts statutes in irreconcilable conflict. Emergency situations might require
prompt action, at least on a temporary basis. And even apart from emergencies,
the President can claim some political justification for actions that tend toward
a single, coherent national policy. Conflicts amongst statutes reflect the
pluralist pressures on Congress, which are not likely to be resolved even if the
President asks Congress to harmonize its own conflicting output. The President, representing the national constituency, arguably has unique opportunities and obligations in these circumstances.
The "faithfully execute" clause could cause a special dilemma for a president faced with the duty of enforcement of a statute that he considered unconstitutional. The oath of office 33 would have to be weighed with the
"faithfully execute" clause. Such a situation arose when President Kennedy
considered impounding funds that benefited segregated schools. Such spending,
in his view, violated the principles of due process and equal protection as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. But he said: "I don't have the power to
cut off the aid in a general way ... and I think it would probably be unwise
to give the President of the United States that kind of power." 34 If a President
feels he cannot faithfully execute an appropriation because he believes it
includes unconstitutional provisions, it would seem proper for the President
to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of the act.
Although the "faithfully execute" clause is the constitutional justification
most frequently cited by the Executive, it may not be the strongest. The
harmonization of laws would certainly be within the power to faithfully execute as long as policy is not affected. But characterization of the clause as a
substantive grant of power to redirect policy is supported by neither reason
nor precedent.3 5 Reason would dictate that the direction to "faithfully execute" is not a carte blanche to arbitrarily cut some programs and execute
others.3 0 If the President were presented with an irreconcilable conflict, he

32. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
33. U.S. CONsT. art II, §1.
34. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1963, at 11, col. 5.

35. 1

W. CROSSKEY,

STATES 390,

POLrrICS AND THE CoNsTrrUTIoN IN THE HISroRY OF THE UNrrED

433-43 (1953).

36. In a memo written while an Assistant Attorney General, Justice William Rehnquist
stated: "[I]t seems . . . anomalous . . . that because the Executive branch is bound to execute the laws, it is free to decline to execute them." Memo from William Rehnquist produced in 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 390, 394.
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should return to Congress for resolution of that conffict rather than wipe out
programs in the process of "harmonization."
Inherent Power. Another constitutional argument advanced by the Executive is that the President has the inherent power to impound,37 on the
basis of the constitutional provision that "[t]he executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America."38 In determining the
extent of power inherent in the Presidency, courts have generally considered
three criteria: (1) the lack of an express constitutional commitment of power
to a coordinate branch or of an express prohibition of its exercise by the
President; (2) the historical and customary exercise of a power by the Executive over a long period of time, coupled with tacit or express congressional
approval; and (3) the existence of a situation that necessitates executive action
for the public interest89
No provision of the Constitution dearly commits the impoundment power
to a coordinate branch or prohibits its exercise by the President. The grant of
the appropriation power to Congress does not, on its face, give Congress power
over the manner in which appropriations are executed, although this extension
may be reasonably implied as a necessary adjunct. However, other constitutional provisions, such as the veto power and the power to legislate, bear directly on the controversy-0 and may provide a textually demonstrable commitment of the power to make policy as distinguished from merely spending.
Therefore, as to impoundments that affect congressional policy, a textually
demonstrable commitment may be found, which precludes exercise of inherent
presidential authority.
Where the text is unclear, the court considers whether the practice is one
of longstanding and whether the action or inaction of Congress has added a
gloss to presidential powers. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exporting

Corp.41 the Supreme Court ruled that the President was the nation's representative in foreign affairs and cited prior congressional acts cognizant of that
fact. In another case,4 2 the Supreme Court found that even congressional
silence could acknowledge the existence of an executive power. The Court
emphasized, however, that the holding did not "mean that the Executive
[could] by his course of action create a power."4 3 Therefore, even though an
act may have continually occurred, it may still be unconstitutional.
The public interest factor usually applies only to short-term reactions to
emergency situations 44 where legislative ratification is expected. 45 A purported
87. Id. at 836-37.
38. U.S. CoNsr. art. 11, §1.
39. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893); Legal Tender Cases,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 534-85 (1871).
40. See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.

41. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
42.
43.
44.
45.

United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
Id. at 474.
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
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"national emergency" is not always sufficient, however, to sustain the claim of
inherent executive power. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer4 6 the
Court ruled that the President was not empowered to seize the steel mills in
order to maintain production for the war effort. The Court placed special
emphasis on the second factor above - Congress had not truly acquiesced to
such practices in the past, but rather had previously considered and rejected
a proposal that would have amended the Taft-Hartley Act to grant the Presi47
dent the powers he was seeking to invoke.
Of the three considerations discussed above, the Executive is currently
relying heavily on the second - longstanding congressional inaction in the
face of ongoing impoundment. 4s Since Jefferson's action in regard to the gunboats on the Mississippi in 1803, 4 9 it is argued, the practice of impoundment
has persisted without any concerted congressional action to curtail it. Precedents prior to 1950 are suspect, however. An amendment to the Anti-Deficiency Act 50 passed in that year specifically granted authority to withhold
funds in instances such as the Jefferson impoundment. If inherent authority
existed to thus withhold, there would have been no necessity for the amendment.5 1 Congressmen usually complain about impoundments, however, only
when particularly affected, and they have not backed legislation to curb the
52
practice of impoundment generally.
The most recent enactment relating to impoundments has been the Impoundment Information and Recording Act, 53 which does not prohibit impoundments but merely requires them to be reported with explanations. Although members of Congress have insisted that the bill was not intended to
permit impoundment,54 the Act contains no language condemning the practice. Bills pending in both Houses attempt to control presidential impoundment, but neither bill prohibits it.

46. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
47. 93 CONG. REC. 3637-45 (1947).
48. See 1973 Hearings,supra note 1, at 359 (remarks of Deputy Attorney General Sneed).
49. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 89-93 infra.
51. Furthermore, Congress found it necessary to grant authority to impound under the
Revenue & Expenditure Control Act of 1968, which again underscores the necessity for
congressional authorization to impound. Act of June 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, §202(b),
82 Stat. 1843.
52. See Ingram, The Billions in the White House Basement, THE WAsmicTON MONTHLY,
Jan. 1972, at 48. "Conservatives like Rep. Charles Bennett of Florida condemned the 'Louis
XIV decision' of the President to block spending on the cross-Florida barge canal, while
conservationist legislators did not voice their constitutional objections. Senator Charles
Percy approves the deferring of public works and highway construction . . . . At the same
time, he says of welfare measures: 'I would be very concerned if a program authorized and
funded by Congress in the area of school lunches, nutrition of the elderly, education-if
those were items not expended by the Administration. There, it's a question of whether the
intention and desire of Congress as the elected representatives of the people is frustrated.'"
id.
53. 31 U.S.C.A. §581c-I (Supp. 1973).
54. 118 CONG. Rsc. S18,533 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1972).
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The weakness of the historical argument in the contemporary context is
that the Nixon impoundments are significantly different from those of past
administrations. 6 Before Franklin D. Roosevelt there were but isolated instances of impoundment. Roosevelt impounded only public works and military appropriations. The administrations of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower,
and Kennedy reveal no pattern of impounding domestic, non-military appropriations. President Lyndon Johnson impounded amounts of unprecedented magnitude from domestic programs for fiscal reasons, with obvious
reluctance because the reductions in spending were applied to many of the
social programs he had vigorously supported. Johnson maintained liaison with
congressional leaders, and Congress expressly authorized some of the Johnson

impoundments.
The Johnson precedent, although less than ten years old, would provide
some support for similar action by his successors. The Nixon impoundments,
while similar in the aggregate dollar amounts involved, are qualitatively different. President Nixon has deliberately and frankly imposed his own priorities, and has thereby frustrated the intent of Congress with regard to
numerous domestic programs. This policy-oriented series of impoundments is
unsupported by tradition. 56
Another possible limitation to inherent power, which is particularly related
to President Nixon's impoundments, was stressed in Curtiss-Wrigh 7 where
the Court recognized a distinction between inherent power in the realms of
foreign policy and domestic affairs. It stated that inherent powers were much
more restricted in the domestic arena s in which most of Nixon's impoundments have occurred. 9

55. See, e.g., Fisher, Impoundment of Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BuFFALO L. REv. 141
(1973); Miller, Impoundment: The New Constitutional Crisis, THE PRoGREsSMw, March 1973,
at 15.
56. Comparisons between past and present impoundments are made difficult by a lack
of any definitive listing of past impoundments. Roosevelt's actions in the field are best stated
in an article by Williams, The Impounding of Funds by the Bureau of the Budget, reprinted
in Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 378 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].The Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations
are mentioned at 291. The Johnson and Nixon administrations are briefly dealt with in
Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 AD. Sc. Q. 361 (1970), more extensively in
Fisher, supra note 55, and generally throughout the 1971 Hearings and the 1973 Hearings,
supra note 1. In addition, lists of "impoundments" have been released by the present Administration with some regularity since 1971.
These sources, together with research in the Congressional Record and Presidential Papers,
compel our stated conclusions. They are further supported by the fact that despite substantial attack on the present Administration's use of impoundment, it has released no
specific figures on past impoundments that contradict either our conclusions or the basis for
those conclusions.
57. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exporting Corp., 299 U.S. 804 (1936).
58. Id. at 320.
59. See OMB Report under Federal Impoundment & Information Act, 38 Fed. Reg.
19,581 (1978).
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Commander in Chief. Even the most ardent opponents of impoundment
have, in principle, accepted the Commander in Chief argument as the President's strongest. 6o President Nixon has not as yet used this justification for any
particular impoundments, but earlier Presidents cited their powers as Commanders in Chief to justify freezes of military expenditures,61 implying that
defense spending is the realm most open to presidential impoundment. 62 In
3
National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger
a case concerning President Nixon's impoundments of HEW funds, the court
thought it significant that the appropriation did not involve defense or foreign
affairs, since those are areas in which the Constitution "may recognize some
64
special authority of the President to deal with developing conditions."
Presidents have also justified impoundment of domestic expenditures under
the Commander in Chief powers during time of war, as did Franklin D.
Roosevelt for the impoundment of public works funds in 1943.65 Historically
the power of Commander in Chief has been expanded during wartime, but the
power to preserve national security is present even during times of peace.
The President's power as Commander in Chief must be considered in context of certain related congressional powers, such as the power to declare war,
to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make
rules for the government and regulation of the armed services. These congressional powers imply limits to presidential prerogative in the exercise of
the Commander in Chief power.
Foreign Affairs. The Curtiss-Wright case recognized that the President's
inherent power in foreign affairs is broader than in domestic matters. Spokesmen for the Nixon Administration have suggested that the President's impoundment of funds for domestic programs finds some support in his foreign
affairs powers. This argument stresses the importance of maintaining a sound
economy and stable fiscal policy at home so as to maximize our ability to
function effectively in international affairs, including balance of payments,
rate of exchange of currency, tariffs, trade, investment, and even national
security. Leaders of other countries might well respect strong action by the
President of the United States in controlling the execution of the budget.
The difficulty of this argument lies in its breadth. Anything done by the
Government of the United States could arguably have some impact on our
foreign affairs posture. The distinction between the President's domestic and
foreign affairs powers is meaningful only upon the assumption that some

60.

See, e.g., 1973 Hearings,supra note 1, at 65 (testimony of Senator Humphrey).

61. See Davis, Congressional Power To Require Defense Expenditures, 33 FORmHAM L.
Rav. 39 (1964); Fisher, supra note 56, at 369.

62. A power collateral to the Commander in Chief power is the President's authority
over foreign affairs. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, §2. Although the foreign affairs power has not been
used to justify any extensive withholdings, it might also be available to the President as a
defense. See Stassen, supra note 35.
63. 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973).

64. Id. at 901.
65.

Fisher, supra note 56, at 365.
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activities are regarded, for these purposes, as being too remote from foreign
affairs to justify the intensified powers which the President can exercise in

foreign affairs. Impoundment of domestic program funds seems to have only
an indirect connection with foreign affairs, and does not invoke the foreign
affairs power in the way indicated by the Curtiss-Wright case.
Shift of Power from Congress to President
History shows that certain powers, at one time exercised by Congress, have
shifted to the Executive. Congress has expressly delegated certain functions to
the Executive, and other functions have shifted in the same direction without
any express delegation. As Justice Jackson said:66
Where is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
Power could conceivably shift, not only from Congress to the President,
but in the reverse direction. However, the trend in recent years has generally
reflected shifts from Congress to the President, and few indicators of the reverse can be found, at least as regards impoundment.
Separation of Powers
The doctrine of separation of powers can be used in support of either side
of the impoundment controversy. If the Constitution is regarded as conferring
discretion upon the President in the execution of appropriations, the notion
of separation of powers can be invoked as a basis for precluding interference
with the President in his performance of this constitutional function. 67 This
argument can lead to the view that any congressional attempt to control impoundment or impose other limitations on the President's discretion in executing appropriations would be unconstitutional. Even though, under this
argument, the President might be immune from congressional control, he
might still be subject to judicial control, to the extent the courts could impose
constitutional standards of due process and equal protection in the manner
of exercising presidential discretion.
On the other hand, if the Constitution is regarded as empowering Congress
not only to appropriate but also to control the manner in which the appropriation is executed, Congress must give adequate guidelines to the ex-

66. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 843 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (concurring
opinion).
67. 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 361-63, 369, 888-40 (testimony of Deputy Attorney

General Joseph T. Sneed).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1974], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

ecutive officials responsible for carrying out its will.68 Failure to provide adequate guidelines can be regarded as an abdication of legislative responsibility,
and consequently as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to
executive officials. An improper delegation could, for example, be urged if
Congress appropriated larger aggregate amounts than it provides by revenues
and debt, without explaining how the President should deal with the resulting
shortfall.69
The delegation problem may be cured, at least in part, if Congress imposes
certain procedures that the President must follow in the exercise of his discretion. 70 And if Congress fails to provide the procedures, the delegation problem may to some extent be mitigated if the President promulgates procedures
to regulate his own exercise of discretion.
The Supreme Court has not invalidated an act of Congress as an improper
delegation of legislative authority since 193571 and is not now likely to invalidate appropriation acts on this basis. Nevertheless, the delegation problem
raises questions of political accountability, which should be considered in
context of the impoundment controversy, even if judicial resolution on this
basis is unlikely.
GENERAL LEGISLATION

When a dispute arises concerning a specific instance of impoundment,
legislative intent becomes a crucial factor. This intent may be found, not only
in the relevant authorizing legislation and appropriation act, but also in the
general statutes discussed below.

68. Occasionally Congress has specifically granted the Executive authority to withhold
funds within statutory limits. See, e.g., Revenue & Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-364, §202(b), 82 Stat. 1843. Additionally, Congress authorized termination of grants
to programs that practiced racial discrimination. 78 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§2000(d)(d)(4) (1970). See Goosetree, The Power of the President To Impound Appropriated Funds:
With Special Reference to Grants-in-Aid to Segregated Activities, 11 Am. U.L. REv. 32 (1962);
Miller, PresidentialPower To Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional
Decision-Making,43 N.C.L. REv. 502 (1965).
69. See notes 111-115 and accompanying text infra.
70. Some standards for exercise of discretion in OMB reserving are found in 31 U.S.C.
§665 (1970). See notes 89-93 and accompanying text infra. Further, standards for exercising
executive authority may vary from program to program depending upon the specificity of
the particular enactment. See notes 203-209 and accompanying text infra.
71. Two well-known cases found Congress had illegally delegated legislative authority.
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refinery Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935). However, the doctrine of delegation is basically defunct. See 4 K. DAvIS,
ADMINIsrRATivE LAW §§28.01, .07 (1958); Jaffee, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power,
47 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1947).
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Anti-Deficiency Act
The Anti-Deficiency Act 72 has been most frequently cited by the OMB as
justification for impoundment7 3 The section most relevant to impoundment
reads: 74
In apportioning any appropriation, reserves may be established to
provide for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings are made
possible by or through changes in requirements, greater efficiency of
operations, or other developments subsequent to the date on which such
appropriation was made available.
Prior versions of the Act were hammered out when the issue was not impoundment, but executive overspending and continual requests from executive departments for supplemental appropriations.7 5 The Act was amended in
1950.76 The language then used was basically identical to that recommended
in a report to the Senate Appropriations Committee by the Bureau of the
Budget and the Comptroller General,77 stating that the "Anti-Deficiency Act,
while designated to prevent deficiencies, does not fill the need for machinery
to conserve appropriations which are in excess of actual requirements."78 In
another report, prepared by the House Appropriations Committee to accompany the 1950 amendments to the Anti-Defidency Act, the following discussion stemmed from consideration of President Truman's impoundment of
Air Force funds:7 9
A major question of policy was determined by Congress, and funds
were provided to implement the policy but the will of Congress was circumvented.
It is perfectly justifiable and proper for all possible economies to be
effected and savings to be made, but there is no warrant or justification
for the thwarting of a major policy of Congress by the impounding of
funds. If this principle of thwarting the will of Congress by the impounding of funds should be accepted as correct, then Congress would
be totally incapable of carrying out its constitutional mandate of providing for the defense of the Nation.
The Bureau of the Budget's 1952 examiner's handbook reflected the spirit
of this report. The handbook declared: "Reserves must not be used to nullify
72. 31 U.S.C. §665 (1970).
73. See 0MB, Report Under Impoundment & Information Act, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,581

(1973). Importantly, however, almost all impoundments before the courts have involved impoundments effected by the individual agencies; they have not been able to. take advantage
of the Anti-Deficiency Act argument, which, at best, would only justify impoundments
actually made by the OMB.

74. 31 U.S.C. §665(c)(2) (1970).
75. See 39 CONG. REc. 3782 (1905) (remarks of Representative Underwood).
76. 64 Stat. 595, 765-68.
77.

Op. COMP. GEN. B-66,949, at 13 (1947), reprinted in 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at

107.
78. Id. Reproduced in part in 1973 Hearings,supra note 1, at 107.
79. H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Scss, $11 (1951),
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the intent of Congress with respect to specific projects or level of programs."' 0
Most commentators interpret the Act as restricting withholdings to those
promoting efficiency and economy, rather than those thwarting congressional
intent.81 But the executive branch interprets this statute much more broadly
and particularly cites the "other developments" language to justify almost all
82
impoundments.
Recent court decisions support the consensus of the commentators. Although the Anti-Deficiency Act was not at issue in the recent impoundment
case of State Highway Commission v. Volpe, a the circuit court stated that its
decision was "not at variance with the provision of the act," since it provides
that reserves may only be established when the funds would "not be required
to carry out the purposes of the appropriation concerned."84 The court concluded that any reserving for " 'subsequent events' . . . must be considered in
context of not violating the purposes and objectives of the particular ap85
propriation statute."
Employment Act of 1946
Another act cited by the Executive in support of impoundment actions is
the 1946 Employment Act,8 6 which was designed to institutionalize the budget
as an economic tool.8 7 After changes made during the congressional bargaining
process, the Act provided for an annual economic report to Congress by the
President assisted by the Council of Economic Advisors8 and for a Joint
Economic Committee to better coordinate congressional fiscal policy. 9 The
Act also contained a policy statement supporting "maximum employment,
production, and purchasing power."90
This broad policy to promote a salutary economic situation is interpreted
by some to support impoundment. 91 The Act itself, however, gives no particular power to the President. In fact, it limits him to an advisory role and
places enactment power in Congress. There is no reference to inflation in the
Act, and the timing of its passage immediately after World War II confirms

80. U.S.

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, EXAMINER'S HANDBOOK

(1952), quoted in Memorandum,

reproduced in part in 1973 Hearings,supra note 1, at 109.
81. See Fisher, Presidential Spending Discretion and Congressional Controls, 37 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 135 (1972); Stanton, The Presidency and the Purse: Impoundment 1803-1973,
45 U. COLO. L. REv. 25 (1973).
82. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 535-36 (testimony of Secretary of Agriculture Butz).

83. 479 F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1973).
84. Id. at 1118.
85.

Id.

86. 15 U.S.C. §§1021-25 (1970).
87. S.BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES
1946, 11-12 (1950).
88. 15 U.S.C. §§1022-23 (1970).
89. Id. §1024.
90. Id. §1021.
91.

A

LAW: THE STORY BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT

Aar

OF

1971 Hearings,supra note 56, at 96 (testimony of Casper Weinberger).
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that the main concern was promoting an economy able to provide jobs for the
returning veterans, rather than fighting inflation. In its original form the bill
92
was titled Full Employment Act and was dedicated to that goal.
A logical construction of the Act indicates that it contemplates final policy
determinations being made by the Congress. Although recommendations from
the President are envisioned, the provisions for a congressional committee
indicate the intent for ultimate legislative input. It would, therefore, not
justify impoundment without review or approval by Congress.
Economic StabilizationAct
Congressional control of the economy also underlies the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971,93 which grant broad powers to the President to
stabilize the economy and fight inflation. The executive branch cited these
statutes as giving it the power to control spending or impound for economic
reasons94 - at least until enactment of the 1973 Amendments, noted below.
In the Act, direct methods of economic control such as authority to stabilize
prices, rents, wages, salaries, interest rates, and corporate dividends are enumerated.95 Impoundment, however, is not mentioned in the 1971 Amendments,
nor was it discussed in the legislative debates.
Furthermore, even if impoundment were considered within the implied
purview of the Amendments, the President would have to follow procedures
prescribed by the Amendments to exercise such authority legitimately. The
Amendments require the President or his designated authority to issue orders
and regulations, with reasons for the orders. The President has designated
the Cost of Living Council, the Pay Board, and the Price Commission to perform these functions under the Amendments; the OMB is not listed.9 6 Since
the OMB is not a designated authority, it cannot lawfully function under the
Amendments, and the OMB's quarterly report of impoundments could not
satisfy the reporting requirement of the Amendments.
It is thus apparent that even if the Stabilization Amendments impliedly
authorize impoundment, procedural requirements are not being followed. In
response it could be argued that the President himself, rather than the OMB,
is in fact making the impoundment decisions, and that they are being reported properly in the OMB reports pursuant to the Impoundment and In97
formation Act.
It is unlikely that the Economic Stabilization Act will be used as justification for future impoundments. Amendments enacted in 1973 contain a direct

92.
93.
94.
(1973).
95.
96.
97.

S. BAiLEY, supra note 87; see 15 U.S.C. §1021 (1970).
Act of Dec. 22, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743.
OMB Report Under Federal Impoundment & Information Act, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,582
Act of Dec. 22, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, §203(a), 85 Stat. 744.
Exec. Order No. 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 218 (1971 Comp.).
31 U.S.C.A. §581c-1 (Supp. 1973).
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prohibition of impoundments under the Act,9 8 and Congress will probably
continue to reenact that provision as long as impoundment remains a volatile
issue.
Debt Ceiling
As a justification for impoundment, the President places major reliance
on the conflict between the public debt ceiling 99 and appropriations. Appropriations entail outlays that, in light of existing revenue, may require more
borrowing than authorized by the debt ceiling. It is arguably the Executive's
duty to seek congressional extension of the debt ceiling, rather than to cut
spending unilaterally, if it appears the debt limit will not allow total outlays
to be met. 100 Furthermore, the ceiling is hardly binding, as a practical matter,
and Presidents have circumvented it continually over the years.10'
As a temporary expedient, the President could draw upon the Treasury's
cash reserve of $6 billion and margin for contingencies of $3 billion. Congress
has acknowledged that this $9 billion could be drawn upon to pay obligations
without extending the debt limit.10 2 In some circumstances, the Government
might even be able to extend payments of contracts by a few weeks, so that
outlays would occur in the next fiscal year. 0 3
If temporary expedients do not suffice, the President should return to
Congress for a solution to the conflict. Congress should make the choice between the basic alternatives: increasing revenues, extending the debt limit,
or reducing expenditures.
If Congress demonstrates its inability to make the hard choice when faced
with an impending crisis, some argument can be asserted in support of decisive presidential action, on grounds discussed in previous pages. But the
President cannot plausibly justify unilateral impoundment on this basis, until
he has first asked Congress to resolve the specific crisis.
98. Act of April 80, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, §4, 87 Stat. 27.
99. 31 U.S.C.A. §757(b) (Supp. 1973).
100. See 31 U.S.C. §13(a) (1970). This section provides that if estimated revenues for
the ensuing fiscal year plus estimated Treasury surplus being carried over into that year are
less than the expenditures projected in his budget, then the President shall accompany the
budget with recommendations for new taxes "or other appropriate action to meet the
estimated deficiency." Id. The legislative history of 31 U.S.C. §13 further indicates that the
President must make the recommendations to Congress. The word "shall" was inserted to
mandate executive action. The predecessor to 31 U.S.C. §13, the "Smith Amendment" 35
Stat. 1027, March 4, 1909, read as follows: "[I']o the end that (the President) may . . .
advise the Congress how in his judgment estimated appropriations could with least injury
to the public service be reduced so as to bring the appropriations within the estimated
revenues, or, if such reduction be not in his judgment practicable without undue injury to
the public service, that he may recommend to Congress such loans or new taxes as may be
necessary to cover the deficiency" (emphasis added). The essence of the "Smith Amendment"
was incorporated into the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 31 U.S.C. §13. The principal
difference was that "may recommend" was changed to "shall recommend."
101. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GuIDE TO CONGRESS 191-95 (1971).
102. See S. REP. No. 1292, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1972). See also S. REP. No. 249, 98d
Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1973).
103. Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1522 (1973).
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Impoundment ReportingAct of 1972
In 1972, Congress passed the Impoundment Information Act, which required reporting of "impoundments" by the Office of Management and
Budget, although it did not define the term. 10 4 There is no procedure for reviewing impoundment nor any prohibition or limitation. The Act merely
required reporting of impoundment, accompanied by reasons for the impoundment and its possible impact. The most commonly cited reason was the AntiDeficiency Act. 10 5
The reports have been criticized as failing to list all impoundments and
omitting required economic analysis of impoundments. 06 The statute grants
no authority to impound and has not been claimed for such power. However,
to be more effective, an adequate definition of impoundment should be added.
LITIGATION

Recent impoundment cases are analyzed under the following major headings: threshold questions, executive privilege against discovery and subpoena,
notice and procedural standards imposed on executive officials in the exercise
of the spending function, and decisions on the merits of specific disputes about
impoundment.
Threshold Questions
Numerous preliminary legal questions have been argued by the Government in recent impoundment cases, including political question, sovereign
immunity, standing, ripeness, and mootness. The Government's arguments
have been almost uniformly rejected by the courts. Questions have also arisen
about related preliminary matters, including the type of remedy available,
and the forum in which impoundment cases should be litigated.
Political Question. In Baker v. Carr'01 the Supreme Court enumerated six
conditions that would preclude the hearing of a case under the political question doctrine: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department, (2) a lack of judicially discoverable
or manageable standards for resolving the issue, (3) the impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind dearly for
nonjudicial discretion, (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government, (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made, and (6) the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.o0
104. 31 U.S.C.A. §581c-1 (Supp. 1973).

105. See notes 89-93 supra.
106. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 55, at 191-99.

107. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
108. Id. at 217. More recently, in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the Court

emphasized the textually demonstrable commitment factor.
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In the impoundment cases, the Government has strenuously urged the
courts to regard the matter as a political question, with special emphasis on
the second condition listed in Baker v. Carr-lack of judicially manageable
standards. Former Deputy Attorney General Sneed has stressed the impossibility and impropriety of judicial administration of an executive agency.109
Courts have in certain instances, however, administered very complicated subjects. Enforcement of Brown v. Board of Education'" has involved the judiciary in establishing standards for integration of local schools, resulting in
what some consider administration of the school systems. Federal courts have
long dealt with antitrust litigation that entails complex economic projections.
There, of course, the political question defense is not involved, but the economic computations called for are similar to those that impoundment cases
might necessitate. It is unlikely that political question will be the basis for
rejecting an impoundment case unless the statute clearly affords wide latitude
to the Executive, making determinations of abuse of discretion impossible."'
A vital purpose of the political question doctrine is to provide the proper
place for final determination of an issue. Thus far, no resolution of the impoundment conflict has come from the Executive or Congress. The courts
seem to provide the only available forum for final determination. In National
Council of Community Mental Health Centers v. Weinberger"2 the district
court stated: "When Congress directs that money be spent and the President,
as Chief Executive, declines to permit the spending, the resulting conflict is
not political."' 13 The court continued: "To say that the Constitution forecloses judicial scrutiny in these circumstances is to urge that the Executive
alone can decide what is best and what the law requires." 1 4 This represents
a sound interpretation of political question in impoundment cases.
Sovereign Immunity. Suits to have impounded funds released, since they
are against the Government or its employees, may be challenged at the threshold on grounds of sovereign immunity. Immunity can be waived only by an
act of Congress. Two major examples of general waivers of immunity are
the Tucker Act," 5 which allows the Government to be sued in contract, and

109. Interviews with Deputy Att'y Gen. Joseph Sneed, Washington, D.C., 1973, conducted by the Staff of the McIntosh Foundation Executive Impoundment Project [hereinafter
cited as Sneed Interview].
110. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Ill. In Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the court ruled
that it could not determine whether a breach of executive duty had occurred when funds
were impounded because of the absence of mandatory language in the statute. Id. at 656.

112. 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973).
113. Id. at 900.
114. Id. at 900-01. Further, it is a function of the courts, not a coordinate branch, to
interpret executive action. In State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1124
(1973), the court said: "'[a]n agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory power.
That is a judicial function."'
115. 28 U.S.C. §1491 (1970).
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the Tort Claims Act of 1946,116 which permits suits in tort. Numerous specific
statutes allow suit against individual agencies. 17
A few courts have interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act as an
implied waiver of sovereign immunity. In Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer" s the circuit court reasoned: "It seems axiomatic to us that one must
imply, from a statement by the Congress that judicial review of agency action
will be granted, an intention on the part of Congress to waive the right of
sovereign immunity.""19 This view is accepted in the Second' 20 and the District
of Columbia Circuits,' 2 ' but commentators have disagreed on the propriety of
22
this interpretation.
The major exception to sovereign immunity is the doctrine allowing suit
against government officials who have not performed their duties. This has
been the law since the landmark case of Ex parte Young in 1908.123 The basic
philosophy behind this exception is expressed in The Floyd Acceptances: "We
have no officer in this government, from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties
and limited authority."' 24 Thus, it can be alleged that a governmental official has, by an impoundment, failed to perform his official duties.
However, in the well-known footnote 11 of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 25 the Supreme Court noted that, if the suit required the
governmental official to take affirmative action, sovereign immunity could still
bar an otherwise justiciable suit.126 This was later modified to apply only to
affirmative action where "an intolerable burden on governmental functions"
would be imposed. 27 Courts have seldom found the burden that great.25
This theory is relevant, since affirmative action must be taken to release impounded funds. Recently a circuit court held that its decision would not be
a "draw on the public treasury," since there was already an appropriation for
operation of the disputed program;' 29 accordingly, the affirmative action doctrine would not bar relief.

116. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1970).
117. See, e.g., Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§1401-35 (1970).
118. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
119. Id. at 874.
120. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 1969).
121. See, e.g., Government Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C.
1973).
122. Compare Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 55, 91-93 (1965), with Student Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments1971, 1972 Duaa L.J. 115, 236.
123. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d

567, 572 (9th Cir. 1971).
124. 74 U.S. (7 WaIl.) 666, 676-77 (1868).

125. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
126. Id. at 691 n.11.
127. Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir. 1969).
128. See Student Project, supra note 122, at 238.
129. State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1111-12 (1973). See also Gov-
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Two impoundment cases, San FranciscoRedevelopment Agency v. Nixon 30
and Housing Authority of San Francisco v. HUD,131 denied relief on the basis
of sovereign immunity. In the first case, the district court held that mandamus
would not lie to force President Nixon to allot certain funds, since the court
believed it could not compel a President to take such affirmative action. Standing. A potential beneficiary of an impounded program clearly has
standing to sue, under the test announced in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp: 33 standing exists if (1) "the plaintiff
alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise, "1 34 and (2) "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'13 An interest group representing potential beneficiaries would also seem to have standing. As observed in
Sierra Club v. Morton: "[A]n organization whose members are injured may
represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review."130
Flast v. Cohen 137 allowed suit to be brought by a taxpayer, challenging
allegedly unconstitutional congressional appropriations, upon a showing of:
(1) a link between taxpayer status and the legislation at issue, and (2) a nexus
between the statute and the infringement. Arguably, a taxpayer may sue to
challenge an impoundment if a nexus can be established between his taxpayer status and the impoundment. For example, a taxpayer could arguably
sue for release of water pollution funds, since Congress intended that his tax
money be spent to improve the environment.
Bills and resolutions have been introduced in Congress to confer standing
upon Congressmen and the General Accounting Office (GAO) to bring suit
to challenge impoundment.138 The paramount problem in this area is whether
an action by a Congressman or the GAO presents a "case or controversy"
satisfying the constitutional requirement." 39 "Case or controversy" requires the
existence of an adversary interest; requests for purely advisory opinions have
been consistently rejected.140 The interest of a Congressman in legislation, although assumed not to be economic, might well be considered an interest
legally capable of being injured. There may be more difficulty justifying the
GAO's standing, since it has no direct hand in legislation and might coneminent Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 68 (D.D.C. 1973).
130. 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
131. 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
132. San Francisco Redev. Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971). But see
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci, 358 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1973).
133. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
134. Id. at 152.
135. Id. at 153.
136. 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
137. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
138. E.g., H.R. 6206, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. Res. 154, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. 373, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). See Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D.
Cal. 1973) (suit brought by Congressman).
139. U.S. CONsr. art. 11, §2.

140.

Golden v. Zwiclder, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
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sequently fall outside the zone of interests. However, GAO may be regarded
as an agent of Congress, entitled to bring suit in order to vindicate the interests of Congress.
Several recent impoundment cases have been brought as class actions. 41
This form reduces the possibility of repetitious litigation and minimizes expenses in suits for relatively small individual amounts. It appears that interest
group litigation or class actions will become widely used methods of seeking
relief from impoundments.
Ripeness and Mootness. In City of New York v. Ruckelshaus 42 the Government contended that suit for the release of impounded waste treatment
funds was premature, since the plaintiff had no guarantee that the projects
for which it sought funding would ultimately be approved. The court rejected this argument, finding that the impoundment had seriously affected
planning and that a controversy existed even though uncertainty prevailed
over the amount to be funded.
Government Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips4s also considered the ripeness issue. Since the defendant was to perform duties as agency head until
July 30, 1973, under the effective appropriations, it arguably could not be
determined before that time whether he would execute the appropriations
properly. The court allowed the suit, however, stating that in determining
the maturity of a controversy it would look to the def~ndant's announced
intentions, which were to dismantle the agency.
While the ripeness doctrine deals with challenges that suit has been filed
prematurely, the mootness doctrine deals with the converse challenge, that
suit has been filed too late.1 4 4 Although at the time of trial funds had been
released to the highway authority, the Eighth Circuit granted a declaratory
judgment in State Highway Commission v. Volpe,145 and held the issue not
moot. Secretary of Transportation Volpe admitted that there was a probability

of future impoundments and that Missouri would "most certainly be affected."1 46 The basic doctrine of mootness states: voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not make the case moot unless the defendant demonstrates that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be re-

peated.1 47 Thus, mere possibility of recurrence may keep the case alive. "However, when the actions questioned are those of the government, the mere prob-

ability of recurrence must be coupled with a certainty that the impact will
8
fall on the same objecting litigants."'4
141. E.g., Government Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973).
142. 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973).
143. 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973).
144. See, e.g., Note, Cases Moot on Appeal, A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA.
L. REv. 772 (1955).
145. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
146. Id. at 1106.
147. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953).
148. State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1106 (8th Cir. 1973), citing Committee To Free the Fort Dix 38 v. Collins, 429 F.2d 807, 812 (3d Cir. 1970). See generally
Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HA&v. L. Rnv. 1672 (1970).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1974], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

Available Remedies. Three major devices have been utilized, together and
separately, by plaintiffs seeking release of funds: writs of mandamus, manda1 49
tory injunction, and declaratory judgment. Mandamus under federal statute
requires that three elements coexist: (1) a clear right in the plaintiff to the
relief sought, (2) a clear duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in
question, and (3) no other available adequate remedy. 150 The primary limitation, however, is that mandamus will not compel an officer to do a discretionary act. Thus mandamus was denied in Housing Authority of San Francisco v.
52
HUD1" 1 because statutory language was interpreted to be discretionary.
Mandatory injunction, an equitable remedy, may be granted where there is no
adequate remedy at law and a threat of irreparable injury. The ministerialdiscretionary dichotomy is not involved. A mandatory injunction has been
granted in several impoundment cases, including State Highway Commission
v. Volpe.' 53 Declaratory judgment' 54 alleviates some of the inequities caused
by the mootness and ripeness doctrines; it is often used in connection with
mandatory injunctions. A real controversy must still exist between the parties
and they must first exhaust any available administrative remedies. No actual
wrong need have occurred at the time of the suit but there must be no uncertainty that loss will occur. This remedy was also granted in State Highway
Commission.'55
Forum. The usual forum for impoundment cases has been the district
courts, with jurisdication based on both federal question 56 and diversity of
citizenship. 15 7 Each of these bases for jurisdiction has been routinely accepted
in impoundment cases and does not appear to present any barrier to litigation,
so federal district courts will apparently continue to handle the bulk of impoundment litigation.
The Court of Claims may award money damages, but no other relief, in
controversies over claims founded "either upon the Constitution or any act of
Congress."' 1 81 This court could therefore serve as a forum in an impoundment
case, if the plaintiff were willing and able to express his claim in terms of
money damages.
The State of Georgia sought to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in 1973, in a suit challenging impoundments of highway, educa-

149. 28 U.S.C. §1361 (1970).
150. Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964, 967 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
151. 840 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
152. Id. at 656.
153. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
154. 28 U.S.C. §§2201-02 (1970).
155. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
156. 28 U.S.C. §1331(a) (1970).
157. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1970).
158. 28 U.S.C. §§171-75 (1970). See generally Ellison, United States Court of Claims:
Keeper of the Nation's Conscience for One Hundred Years, 24 GEo. WAsH. L. R~v. 251 (1956).
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tion, and water pollution funds.' 59 Georgia filed suit both as parens patriae
and on the basis of the proprietary interests of the state. The Court elected,
however, not to accept the case, perhaps finding persuasive the argument that
the issue would be better framed through the appellate process.1 6°
Executive PrivilegeAgainst Discovery and Subpoena
The claim of executive privilege has been made since the time of Washington,161 but its scope has never been dearly defined. The issue may arise
when executive branch witnesses are questioned about facts and procedures
surrounding a decision to impound.
After a reversal and remand by the Fourth Circuit in Campaign Clean
Water v. Train, 62 litigation reached a stage in which factfinding was required.
The plaintiffs have deposed the original administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, William Ruckelshaus. 63 The question of privilege could
arise if discovery were to extend to the White House.
Notice and ProceduralStandards
There has been a great disparity in the extent of notice given prior to
various impoundments;16 4 only one decision, Berends v. Butz, 65 has thus far
directly considered the issue.
In June 1972 the Secretary of Agriculture declared fourteen counties in
Minnesota "emergency loan areas" after severely damaging floods; FHA
emergency loan funds were thereupon made available. On December 27, without other notice, he teletyped a message to his regional office that no more
loan applications would be processed after that date. Four farmers sought release of the loan funds. The district court held, in Berends, that the Secretary

159. Georgia v. Nixon, 94 S.Ct. 25 (1973). A suit for original jurisdiction may be brought
in two contexts. The state can sue to vindicate a proprietary interest of the state or as
parenspatriae.See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). A requirement for jurisdiction as parens patriae is that the state represent the interests of substantially all its citizens
rather than just interest groups. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). Further, the

Court is not compelled to hear the case even if jurisdiction is available. The Court has absolute discretion in determining whether to take original jurisdiction. See Oklahoma ex rel.
Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938). See also Note, The OriginalJurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. Rxv. 665, 708-18 (1959).
160. Brief for Connecticut et al. as Amid Curiae at 4, Georgia v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 25
(1973). The Court, however, denied without opinion Georgia's motion to file a bill of
complaint.
161. See generally Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.LA.L.
REv. 1044 (1965).
162.

Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va. 1973),

remanded with directions sub nom. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, No. 73-1745 (4th
Cir., Dec. 10, 1973).
163. Telephone Interview with W. Thomas Jacks, attorney for Campaign Clean Water,
January 1974.
164. See 119

CONG. REc. S 21,120, S 21,123 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1973).
165. 357 F. Supp. 143 (D.Minn. 1973).
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had violated the rulemaking procedures of the APA66 in that the order setting
the application deadline was a "rule" that entitled the potential loan recipients to adequate notice. The court noted that Chief Justice Burger, when a
circuit judge, had recognized that notice under the APA was a right and not
a formalityl

C7

Furthermore, the court stated that the unilateral termination of

the program without notice to the Minnesota farmers offended "all traditional
notions of fair play."' 63
The Berends decision is a significant indication that courts will require
government officials to observe fair procedures in notifying beneficiaries about
decisions to terminate funding. It remains to be seen whether the courts will
be equally insistent that officials observe fair procedures in making the decision
to cut off or delay funding.
Mandatory v. Permissive Appropriations
Appropriation bills, as generally passed, are acknowledged to be permissive
in nature, at least to the extent of not requiring the expenditure of every
of the chairman of the House Appenny. This is supported by a statement
16 9
propriations Committee, George Mahon:

[T]he weight of experience and practice bears out the general proposition that an appropriation does not constitute a mandate to spend every
dollar appropriated. That is a generally accepted concept. It squares
with the rule of common sense. I fully subscribe to it.... I believe it is
fundamentally desirable that the Executive have limited powers of impoundment in the interests of good management and constructive economy in public expenditures.
However, special language in an appropriation bill can have an effect on
execution. President Nixon, in vetoing an HEW-OEO appropriation, stated
as a reason: "[N]early nine tenths of these increases is for mandatory programs
which leave the Executive Branch no discretion whatever as to the level or
the purpose of the added expenditures."'170 In 1962 a bill reported by the
House Appropriations Committee "directed" that an amount not less than
$491 million be spent for the RB-70 weapons system.17' After strenuous efforts
by President Kennedy, Congress deleted the work "directed,'' 17 2 indicating
Kennedy's belief that this language would have an effect on his spending
discretion. It therefore appears that while Congressmen acknowledge that not
all appropriations are mandatory, Presidents at the same time have recog-

166. 5 U.S.C. §553 (1970).
167. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
168. 357 F. Supp. at 152.
169. 1971 Hearings, supra note 56, at 501. However, Congressman Mahon has also said
with reference to impoundment, "economy is one thing, and the abandonment of a policy
and program of the Congress another thing." 95 CoNG. REC. 15, 126 (1949).
170. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT, State of the Union Address, Jan. 27, 1970, at 22.
171. H.R. REP. No. 1406, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1962); see Davis, supra note 85, at 40.
172. See Davis, supra note 61, at 43-44.
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nized that Congress does have the power to affect their spending discretion
by couching appropriations in mandatory terms.
ObligationTo Pay for Value Received
There is general agreement that an appropriation made by Congress is
not mandatory, and that, on the other hand, the executive branch does not
have absolute discretion to withhold funds.
A leading case is Kendall ex rel. Stokes v. United States.1 7 3 A statement,
which sounds particularly damaging to the executive position, is found in
the opinion: "To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to
see the laws faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution is
a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible."' 174 Even
apart from factual distinctions between Kendall and current controversies,
however, it must be recognized that each is the product of its time. Kendall
was decided in 1838, prior to appropriations committees, the Bureau of the
Budget, and, importantly, the establishment of the Court of Claims, which
would probably handle Kendall if it were to arise todayY 5 In Kendall the
Postmaster General had removed credits reserved for work performed by the
decedent, and in response Congress passed a special act directing the expenditure of funds due by virtue of the credits. The special act was necessitated by the barrier of sovereign immunity in the period prior to passage of
the Tucker Act. 76 Today, even the Executive's strongest advocates support
the Kendall conclusion as it relates to payments for performance of fulfilled
177
obligations.
Another series of cases shows that congressional appropriations are permissive and allow the President discretion rather than mandating him to
spend every penny. A primary example is Campagna v. United States78 decided in the Court of Claims. At issue was a Marine Corps musician's statutory
right to compensation under the general naval appropriations act, which provided appropriations for the Marine Corps. In denying the right of payment,
the court stated: "An appropriation is per se nothing more than legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of
the Treasury."' 79

173. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). See also United States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885).
174. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613.
175. The Court of Claims has jurisdiction over debt claims against the Government.

See text accompanying note 183 infra.
176. 28 US.C. §1491 (1970).
177. Sneed Interview, supra note 109.
178. 26 Ct. Cl. 316 (1891). See also Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
"The interference of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief; and
we are quite satisfied that such a power was never intended to be given to them." Id. at
516. But the application of this doctrine to issues such as standing to sue prior to the award

of a federal contract, Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), has been loosened in
such cases as Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
179. 26 Ct. Cl. at 317.
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To the same effect, McKay v. Central Electric Power Cooperative"s considered whether the Interior Department Appropriation Act of 1953181 imposed a duty upon the administrator to use appropriated funds to operate
government-leased electric transmission systems. The court held that the expenditure of money for this activity was within the discretion of the Executive,
noting: "The Act is permissive only. It does not impose upon the appellants
a clear affirmative duty to use the funds for that specific purpose." 1' 8 2 Whether
appropriation statutes are generally permissive was not discussed.
None of the cases cited by either side directly reach the more difficult issues presented by the current impoundment controversy. The most that can be
said is that an obligation for work performed must be paid by the Government but that a general appropriation does not compel the Executive to
spend every cent.
Determining the Intent of Congress
Rather than dealing with broad generalizations, courts must evaluate
specific statutes and particular statutory provisions to determine whether the
statute is mandatory or discretionary and, if the statute is discretionary, to
decide whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Cases have compelled
courts to interpret legislation controlling several types of executive action
including allotment,18 3 obligation 8 4 processing of grant application, 185 and
18 6
OMB reserving.
In State Highway Commission'87 the Eighth Circuit determined that the
terms of certain highway legislation effectively precluded the Secretary of
Transportation from withholding funds. While the basic threshold questions
of sovereign immunity and political question were argued, 8 the bulk of the
opinion was devoted to interpretation of the Highway Act'8 9 and its legislative history. Judge Lay wrote: "The issue before us is not whether the Secretary abused his discretion in imposing contract controls but whether the Secretary has been delegated any discretion to so act in the first place,"'190 here
contemplating the possibility that obligation of funds was merely a ministerial
act.

180. 223 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
181. Act of July 31, 1953, ch. 298, 67 Stat. 261.
182. 223 F.2d at 625.
183. See notes 201-206 and accompanying text infra.
184. See notes 189-192 and accompanying text infra.
185. See notes 195, 198 infra.
186. See notes 89-93 supra. See also Rooney v. Lynn, No. 2010-73 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 7,
1973).
187. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
188. The court found the case justiciable and devoid of any political question, saying
that "resolution of the issue before us does not involve an analysis of the Executive's constitutional powers." 479 F.2d at 1106.
189. 23 U.S.C. §§101 et seq. (1970).
190. 479 F.2d at 1106-07.
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The majority found that the history and over-all logic of the Highway Act
demonstrated that Congress wished the program to be carried out.191 The
court did not hold that the Highway Act funding was completely mandatory;
in fact, there could be withholding for administrative purposes. 9 2 But countering inflation was an unacceptable rationale for slowing down the program.
The thrust of the opinion was that the basic intent of Congress could not be
circumvented by withholding funds.
The dissent, placing equal weight on statutory interpretation, reached the
opposite conclusion. Persuasive to the dissent were the opinions of Attorneys
General that Congress was merely stating a wish and not mandating 93 when it
used the phrase: "[I]t is the sense of Congress that ... no... sums authorized
upon any Federal-Aid system

. . .

shall be impounded."' 194 Pursuant to this

interpretation, the dissent found more latitude in the discretion given the
Administration.
In Housing Authority of San Franciscov. HUD,

95

a case involving failure

to process grant applications, the court used a different approach than the
Eighth Circuit, reading only the specific statutory language rather than studying the enactment and history of the statute as a whole. Finding the language
to be discretionary, the court declined to rule on the merits because of the political question and sovereign immunity barriers. The court recognized the
Larson9 8 exception to the sovereign immunity rule; that is, an officer of the
Government can be sued if (1) he is acting beyond his dudes or (2) he is acting
under an unconstitutional grant of authority. Discretionary language, however, compelled a finding that the HUD Secretary was not acting beyond the
scope of his authority and that judicially manageable standards were lacking
because of the broad grant of discretion to the Secretary. 197 The HUD case
demonstrates that a finding of discretionary language can trigger threshold
legal questions and prevent a determination on the merits.
The second method, that used by the HUD court, places more restrictions
upon Congress. If the magic words "direct" or "mandate" are not present, the
court will not look to a detailed history or over-all structure of the Act. Such
language may be difficult to pass in all circumstances. A proper approach in
the event of mandatory appropriations, however, would be to read the mandatory appropriation together with the And-Deficiency Act - the result being
a mandate to spend all funds except those withheld for administrative pur-

191. Recognizing the need to look to the over-all logic of the particular enactment involved, the Volpe court, quoting the Supreme Court, stated: "We believe it fundamental
that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole
Act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in interpreting legislation, 'we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence but [should] look to the provisions of
the whole law and to its object and policy.'" Id. at 1111-12.
192. 479 F.2d at 1112-14.
193. Id. at 1120-22 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
194. 23 U..C. §101(c) (1970).
195. 340 F. Supp. 654 (W.D. Cal. 1972).
196. Larson v. Domestic 9- Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
197. 340 F. Supp. 654, 656-57.
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poses. Given this interpretation, limited use of mandatory language could
prove valuable in articulating congressional priorities.
Government Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips 98 presented another question of congressional intent. Community Action Agencies, operating within
the Office of Economic Opportunity, had been ordered dismantled during
fiscal year 1973 because, according to the defendant, the President did not
intend to include them in his budget for fiscal year 1974. The court found
that the refusal to spend funds in fiscal year 1973 by OEO Director Phillips
was not justified by the President's refusal to recommend funds for the next
fiscal year. The important point to the court was that Congress had not
dictated a change, its last word being an OEO authorization for fiscal year
1973.
Another group of cases, involving perhaps the largest amount of money,
dealt with impoundments of Clean Water Act"99 funds. After a presidential
veto was overridden and sums were authorized for fiscal years 1973 and 1974
totalling $11 billion, the President instructed the Director of the EPA to
allot only $5 billion. The President told Director Ruckelshaus:200
These amounts will provide for improving water quality and yet give
proper recognition to competing national priorities for our tax dollars,
the resources now available for this program and the projected condition of the Federal treasury under existing tax laws and the statutory
limit on the national debt.
The first decision on this impoundment was handed down in City of New
York v. Ruckelshaus.20 The district court held the allotment procedure of the
Clean Water Act 202 to be a ministerial function compelling defendant Ruckelshaus to allot the full amounts authorized. 20 3 Finding that a plain meaning
interpretation of the language would be inadequate, the court examined the
relevant statutory history. Of particular importance were found to be the views
of the sponsors of the bill. It must be noted that the court needed to interpret
only one phase of the funding process-allotment. Requiring allotment, however, does not necessarily mean there will be an expenditure. The funds must
then be obligated before actually expended. Conceivably, "contract controls,"
which were used to impound funds in Missouri Highway Commission v. Volpe,
could be invoked after the allotment phase.
198. 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973). For a case in which the court determined processing
of applications was mandatory see Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci, 358 F. Supp. 973
(D.D.C. 1973); Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973).
199. 33 U.S.C.A. §§1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973). As of July 1973 there were nine such cases.
200. Letter from Richard Nixon to William Ruckelshaus, Nov. 22, 1972 (Exhibit A in
Plaintiff's Memorandum, Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.
Va. (1973).
201. 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), afJ'd sub nom., New York v. Train, No. 73-1705
(D.C. Cir., Jan. 23, 1974).
202. 33 U.S.C.A. §1285 (Supp. 1973).
203. The court initially stated that sovereign immunity was no bar to suit, since the
case fell within the well-settled exception challenging acts of federal officers, which go beyond
the scope of their statutory powers. See text accompanying notes 125-143 supra.
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Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus 20 4 concerned the same bill. At
the district court level, Judge Mehridge determined on the basis of legislative
history that allotment in section 1285 of the Act was discretionary. The court
also found the administrator had abused his discretion as a matter of law by
withholding fifty-five per cent of the available allotment. 20 5 Appeal was taken

by the administrator to the Fourth Circuit, which agreed that the judiciary
could review an agency's action under a discretionary allotment procedure. It
20
said: O

[W]hether an agency, in exercising its asserted discretionary power
under a legislative authorization, is acting in a manner consistent with
the legislative purpose and with the proper regard for the constitutional
principle of separation of powers between the executive and legislative
[sic] is an issue that Section 10 did not intend to make nonreviewable;
it patently is not an issue "committed to agency discretion."
On the merits, however, the court reversed, holding that the administrator
had not, as a matter of law, violated his discretion. The Court remanded with
instructions to obtain information on the impact of impoundment on program
goals and on the reasons for the administrator's actions. This decision, if followed by other courts, could potentially result in protracted litigation and
difficult proof of fact because of executive privilege claims and the need for
expert witnesses.
These examples demonstrate the central role statutory interpretation has
played in the impoundment controversy. Discovery of congressional purpose
triggers operation of threshold doctrines such as sovereign immunity and due
process and also provides a basis for determining whether actions of an administrator have contravened congressional intent. Courts have avoided many
more of the more delicate constitutional questions by grounding their decisions on statutory interpretations. They have not considered it necessary to
reach the constitutional questions after finding violations of statutes.
Most commentators 20 7 and a majority of courts208 acknowledge that impoundments are permissible if they fall under the Anti-Deficiency Act or if
the action taken under the particular statute is discretionary and found to
be within the administrator's discretion. Other impoundments are illegal
and contrary to congressional intent. The decision whether a particular impoundment is legal requires an interpretation of congressional intent in particular statutes, with due regard to such general statutes as the Anti-Deficiency
Act.

204. 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va. 1973), remanded with directions sub nom., Campaign
Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, No. 73-1745 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 10, 1973).
205. Id.
206. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, No. 73-1745, at 15 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 10, 1973).
207. E.g., Church, Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: The Decline of Congressional
Control over Executive Discretion, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1240 (1970); Fisher, supra note 56; Miller,
supra note 68.
208. E.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.gd 1099 (8th Cir, 1973).
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CONCLUSION

The impoundment controversy of 1972-1973 has demonstrated an unacceptably high level of tension between Congress and the President, as regards
the execution of appropriations. This tension, reflected in conflicts concerning
the respective spending priorities of Congress and the President, has tended to
undermine citizen confidence in government itself.
Most of the recently litigated cases have been decided on statutory, rather
than constitutional grounds, and most have been decided against the President.
Decisions on statutory grounds can provide no final answer, since each impounded program has a different statutory basis that requires distinct statutory
analyses. The ultimate constitutional questions have not been answered, although some constitutional standards have been implied. Commentators have
addressed at least some of the constitutional questions. The consensus is that
the President does not possess any authority that justifies him in terminating
2°
or drastically curtailing a program in frustration of the intent of Congress. s
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will decide any of the
constitutional issues. Until the Court acts, solutions to the impoundment controversy must be sought elsewhere.
Bills pending in the Senate and the House attempt to reform the budget
process and to control the ability of the President to impound funds. The
political future of these proposals is, at the time of writing, uncertain.
The present authors have drafted a series of recommendations, dealing
with budget reform and impoundment control. Our recommendations, to be
published separately, impose even more stringent controls on both Congress
and the President, in the formulation, enactment, and execution of appropriations.
The impoundment controversy reflects serious shortcomings in the entire
budget process of the federal government. The process features too much
secrecy, too little planning, and too little accountability of public officials for
crucial decisions. Reform of the entire budget process is essential, in order to
provide a framework for the responsible and restrained exercise of authority.

209. See Boggs, Executive Impoundment of Congressionally Appropriated Funds, 24
U. FLA. L. REV. 221 (1972); Church, supra note 207; Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 124 (1969); Fisher, The Politics of
Impounded Funds, 15 AD. ScI. Q. 361 (1970); Fisher, supra note 81; Goosetree, supra note 68;
Miller, supra note 68; Stanton, supra note 81; Stassen, Separation of Powers and the Uncommon Defense: The Case Against Impoundment of Weapons Systems Appropriations, 57
GEo. L.J. 1159 (1969); Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1505 (1973); The
Likely Law of Executive Impoundment, 59 IOWA L. REv. 50 (1973); Note, Protecting the
Fisc: Executive Impoundment and CongressionalPower, 82 YALE L.J. 1636 (1972).
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